…explained on a channel 2 news cast, before, that the main civilian casualties in Southern Lebanon have been those of the families of Hizballah activists (sorry, can’t find a link). He went on to say that the homes targetted had been warehouses storing Fajr missiles. These families had built on additional rooms to their homes, in which to store these missiles. The IDF decided that it was vital to take out these missiles, and that taking these civilian lives was regrettable but necessary.

We can only be sorry that these Hizballah activists could so callously put their families in danger.

A few words about these Fajr missiles, by Patrick Devenny, in Middle East Quarterly:

…Hezbollah’s growing stocks of Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets. Iran began large-scale delivery of the Fajr-3 in 2000 and the Fajr-5 in 2002, with the approval of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.[6] Iranian cargo and passenger jets transport the weaponry from Iran to Damascus International Airport where they can be off-loaded by Hezbollah agents and members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The weapons are then trucked to the Bekaa Valley. Other reports suggest some Iranian cargo flights land at Beirut International Airport, providing Hezbollah with a more direct supply route although this process may have changed with the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and the change in Lebanese government.[7]

The Fajr-type rocket represents a significant upgrade to any threat assessment of Hezbollah. Designed by Iran with aid from China and North Korea, both classes of weapons are fired from mobile launchers, including customized Japanese trucks, and carry 200 pound high-explosive payloads. The Fajr-3 has a range of 25 miles while its more powerful upgrade, the Fajr-5, has a range of 45 miles. Accordingly, the Fajr extends Hezbollah’s strike range well beyond Haifa. While the number of Fajr missiles in Hezbollah’s possession is unclear, Israeli estimates suggest an arsenal of at least several hundred.[8] In addition, Hezbollah has an unknown number of other missiles such as Syrian reproductions of Soviet BM-27 220mm rocket systems, which also can carry a warhead of 220 pounds to a range between 30-45 miles.

[…]

Adding the Fajr rockets to the mix, however, raises the threat. Haifa, Israel’s third largest city with a population of some 270,000 people, now lies within Hezbollah range. Even a modest barrage of 75 Fajr-5 rockets hitting the city would represent 15,000 pounds of high explosives detonating in the midst of a densely populated cosmopolitan area. The coastal cities of Acre and Nahariya—with populations of 55,000 and 41,000 respectively—might expect an even heavier assault due to Hezbollah’s ability to target them with both the Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 models. While the Fajrs are not very precise—the sheer number of rockets at Hezbollah’s disposal makes Israel vulnerable.

And more, by Michael I. Krauss and J. Peter Pham, in FDD (published on July 6th, very interesting timing):

Iran builds the Fajr missiles with Chinese and North Korean assistance. Fajrs are fired from hard-to-destroy mobile launchers, and can carry up to 200 pounds of explosives from 25 (for the Fajr-3) to 45 miles (for the Fajr-5). Israeli intelligence estimates that several hundred Fajr rockets have been delivered so far. Most are aimed at Israel’s third largest city, Haifa, home to one of the Jewish state’s two oil refineries and to Matam Park, the hub of its high-tech industry. To help with targeting, Hezbollah has access to Iranian-controlled Mirsad-1 unmanned aerial vehicles which can transmit live video footage.

Why is Iran so generous to its Lebanese friends? In addition to the obvious ideological affinities (a hatred of Jews and a desire to increase Shia influence), recent international pressure on Tehran has increased Hezbollah’s value to the mullahs as a bargaining chip. As Eli Karmon of Israel’s International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism elaborated to the Jerusalem Post recently, Iran has the flexibility to “use Hezbollah either before pressure is put on them, in order to deter the United States — or else afterwards, once there are aggressive policies or actions by the Security Council, Hezbollah can be used to strike back.” One might add that the Hezbollah arsenal also acts as a deterrent against an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities (an option that is, in any event, fraught with logistical difficulties).

Hmmm. I smell a (friendly) rat. They continue:

Time is not on Israel’s side here. Eventually, Israel may feel compelled to exercise its sovereign right to self-defense by preemptively attacking in a manner that not only eliminates the Fajr rockets, but also prevents Tehran from easily reestablishing them. While such a unilateral move will no doubt meet with publicly expressed consternation, the fact is that the nature of threat makes it hard to argue that there is a framework that legally binds the Jewish state to seek prior authorization to effectively defend itself against foes who revel in genocidal fantasies. And the fact is that should it take strong action, Israel, the U.S., and all those who fear a nuclear Iran will all be able to breathe a bit easier. For all our sakes, it’s high time to bring Hezbollah back into the international limelight.

And there’s your answer, Monsieur Chirac.